Letter of Comment No: 6475 File Reference: 1102-100

ikon

Allan Thygesen [Allan.Thygesen@carlyle.com]

From: Sent:

Thursday, July 01, 2004 2:18 AM

To:

Director - FASB

Cc:

jdowling@ncta.org; Bob Grady

Subject: Reference File No. 1102-100

Dear FASB,

I am writing to express my concern over your Exposure Draft relating to expensing of employee stock options.

As background, I am currently a general partner and managing director in Carlyle Venture Partners II, a \$600M venture fund focused on minority investments in private technology companies. Prior to joining Carlyle, I was an executive and held stock options in five private and public technology companies. Some of these companies were successful and I was able to realize gains on my options. Others were not, and I either never exercised the options, or exercised and sold or held for a loss. Thus, I bring the perspective of both the venture investor/board member and the operating executive in a company utilizing stock options to incent employees, and have first hand experience with the volatility and unpredictability of the value of stock options. Finally, I hold Master's degrees in both economics and business administration, and thus have some understanding of the more intellectual aspects of the issues.

My first and most fundamental observation is that issuance of stock options does not constitute an expense. It does not affect revenues, cash expenditures or company operations. It is as capital account event, which causes dilution of existing shareholders - but that is already captured through (fully diluted) EPS calculations. I accept that options logically imply an opportunity cost. Had the corporation not issued stock options to the employees, incremental cash and/or deferred/incentive compensation would have been necessary. However, we don't impute opportunity costs on the income statement. By that logic, you could argue that companies should impute interest expense when they sell shares to investors, since they would otherwise have had to issue debt, and debt would carry interest.

Furthermore, if options are expensed, it would effectively constitute double dipping: the same event would cause an expense hit and a dilution hit to EPS. Expensing stock options is fundamentally inconsistent with long standing accounting principles: Financial statements are intended to capture historical, not unknowable future events. They should record and "match" the burdens and benefits of a transaction, but options only cause dilution when the share price rises. And paid-in capital should only increase when the company receives cash.

I recognize that the Exposure Draft may in part have been motivated by concerns over highly publicized concerns over management excesses and/or corporate governance issues, and I share the concern that some executives appear to have been successful in convincing their boards to grant stock options that excessively enriched management and diluted share holders. But that is a corporate governance issue that should not be addressed through financial statement standards.

Assuming for the moment that FASB wishes to expense options, despite the very fundamental arguments against outlined above, there are numerous problems with the proposal as presented:

- (1) The determination of value at the time grant is extremely difficult, since the prospects of the private firm and the probability of the individuals continued employment with the firm are fundamentally unknowable. There is no established measure of volatility for private companies, meaning that "estimation" of Black Sholes volatility is subject to manipulation and inaccuracy. Young public companies suffer from the same problem. Furthermore, the probability of continued employment is unknowable. Intrinsic value reporting, which would be allowed under FASB's proposal, is even worse than Black Sholes, since it would causing violent and frequent swings in value of the same grant over time, and require companies to mark options to market each period.
- (2) The effective term of the options is much shorter than assumed in the draft. Employee stock options generally vest monthly over 4 or 5 years with an initial "cliff" or minimum employment period, which is usually 12 months. Almost all employees receiving stock options are "at will", meaning they can be fired or leave at any time. Since almost all employee stock options must be exercised within 90 days of the termination of employment, the effective term is very short. This point is argued very well in "Accounting for Stock Options" by Stanford's John Shoven and Jeremy Bulow, which I understand has been presented to FASB. In addition to their arguments, employee options can't be traded, hedged or sold. All of this of argues for a much lower value than proposed by FASB and introduces a significant negative bias in the reported earnings of companies issuing stock options, were FASB's proposal to be adopted.

- (3) Estimating exercise behavior for groups of employees is practically impossible. I can tell you from practical experience that the dispersion of estimates of the future value of stock by employees within the same firm is extremely wide and not discernable by a finance department or it's auditor.
- (4) The cost of compliance will be very significant for private and public companies, given the large amounts of data that must be collected and models that must be created and revisited each reporting period.

I believe the net result of the FASB proposal would be to introduce a excessively volatile, subjective <u>and most importantly misleading</u> line item in income statements of public and private companies. This is hurtful, not helpful to current and prospective shareholders. While it is true that stock analysts and sophisticated investors will immediately proceed to reverse the stock options expenses out of earnings in order to get a better picture of profitability, that is hardly an argument for adopting the proposal.

Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't close by mentioning that there are very important macro-economic arguments relating to the level of entrepreneurship, the flexibility of labor markets, US competitiveness and overall growth that all argue of favor of maintaining the status quo. I recognize these issues don't have a direct bearing on the accounting issues that FASB is normally evaluating, but this is a ruling that would have potentially devastating effect on our national wealth. I hope you bear this in mind as you consider revising the draft.

Allan C. Thygesen

Managing Director The Carlyle Group 600 Montgomery Street, 39. floor San Francisco, CA 94111

ph 415-678-3531 fax 415-678-3510 cell 650-208-7030

- CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE -

The information contained in this transmission is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. If you are not the intended recipient of this information, do not review, retransmit, disclose, disseminate, use, or take any action in reliance upon, this information. If you received this transmission in error, please contact the sender and destroy all printed copies and delete the material from all computers.



Letter of Comment No: 647 b File Reference: 1102-100

WASHINGTON SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

902 140TH AVE NE BELLEVUE, WA 98005-3480 (425) 644-4800

June 23, 2004

Financial Accounting Standards Board P.O. Box 5116 Norwalk, Connecticut 06856-5116

RE: Comments on FASB Exposure Draft entitled "Share-Based Payments, an Amendment of FASB Statements

No. 123 and 95"

File Reference 1102-100

To Whom It May Concern:

The following are comments on the above Exposure Draft, from the Washington State Society committee on Accounting, Auditing and Review Services. We appreciate your consideration of them.

1. The Board has reaffirmed the conclusion in Statement 123 that employee services received in exchange for equity instruments give rise to recognizable compensation cost as the services are used in the issuing entity's operations (refer to paragraphs C13–C15). Based on that conclusion, this proposed Statement requires that such compensation cost be recognized in the financial statements. Do you agree with the Board's conclusions? If not, please provide your alternative view and the basis for it.

No, we do not agree with these conclusions. For privately-held companies, when the stock options are granted, they usually have low or zero value. (If these options had value, the employees would gladly buy them from their employers when they are vested! In fact, the employees usually do not consider the purchase of their options until their employment is terminated.) If the company's stock has not increased in value, thereby creating value in the stock options, then the employees usually let the options lapse. Thus, no actual compensation expense has been incurred by the Company.

Assessing value to stock options, especially in privately-held companies, is speculative, at best. Due to the speculative nature of the valuation, we believe it is not prudent to record the related compensation expense (which is also speculative) that may never occur.

For public companies, the value of the stock options can be determined, as there is a current market for the related company stock. However, whether or not the employee will ever exercise his/her option is still speculative, and the compensation expense may never be actually incurred by the Company.

2. Statement 123 permitted enterprises the option of continuing to use Opinion 25's intrinsic value method of accounting for share-based payments to employees provided those enterprises supplementally disclosed pro forma net income and related pro forma earnings per share information (if earnings per share is presented) as if the fair-

Page 2

value-based method of accounting had been used. For the reasons described in paragraphs C26–C30, the Board concluded that such pro forma disclosures are not an appropriate substitute for recognition of compensation cost in the financial statements. Do you agree with that conclusion? If not, why not?

Yes, we agree that these disclosures are not an appropriate substitute for public companies

For privately-held companies we agree that the disclosures are not an appropriate substitute, especially as there are several variables that do not apply to privately-held companies.

3. This proposed Statement would require that public companies measure the compensation cost related to employee services received in exchange for equity instruments issued based on the grant-date fair value of those instruments. Paragraphs C16–C19 and C53 explain why the Board believes fair value is the relevant measurement attribute and grant date is the relevant measurement date. Do you agree with that view? If not, what alternative measurement attribute and measurement date would you suggest and why?

No, we do not agree. Although this is practical, it is also arbitrary. The IRS handles this issue better in that income is based on what really happens. However, if an expense is to be recorded, fair value at grant date (for public companies only) is appropriate.

4a. This proposed Statement indicates that observable market prices of identical or similar equity or liability instruments in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and, if available, should be used to measure the fair value of equity and liability instruments awarded in share-based payment arrangements with employees. In the absence of an observable market price, this proposed Statement requires that the fair value of equity share options awarded to employees be estimated using an appropriate valuation technique that takes into consideration various factors, including (at a minimum) the exercise price of the option, the expected term of the option, the current price of the underlying share, the expected volatility of the underlying share price, the expected dividends on the underlying share, and the risk-free interest rate (paragraph 19 of Appendix A). Due to the absence of observable market prices, the fair value of most, if not all, share options issued to employees would be measured using an option-pricing model. Some constituents have expressed concern about the consistency and comparability of fair value estimates developed from such models. This proposed Statement elaborates on and expands the guidance in Statement 123 for developing the assumptions to be used in an option-pricing model (paragraphs B13–B30). Do you believe that this proposed Statement provides sufficient guidance to ensure that the fair value measurement objective is applied with reasonable consistency? If not, what additional guidance is needed and why?

This "method of valuation" is arbitrary, done in an effort to record "something" on the books for stock options granted. If there is no market for the particular company's stock, assigning a "value", with no basis, is inappropriate.

Also, this requires the CPA to use judgment in determining the value. CPA firms may incur significant liability in utilizing these methods if there is not a reasonable or rational "range" to use, and that range is disclosed.

4b. Some constituents assert that the fair value of employee share options cannot be measured with sufficient reliability for recognition in the financial statements. In making that assertion, they note that the Black-Scholes-Merton formula and similar closed-form models do not produce reasonable estimates of the fair value because they do not adequately take into account the unique characteristics of employee share options. For the reasons described in paragraphs C21–C25, the Board concluded that fair value can be measured with an option-pricing model with sufficient reliability. Board members agree, however, that closed-form models may not necessarily be the best available technique for estimating the fair value of employee share options— they believe that a lattice model (as defined in paragraph E1) is preferable because it offers the greater flexibility needed to reflect the unique

Page 3

characteristics of employee share options and similar instruments. However, for the reasons noted in paragraph C24, the Board decided not to require the use of a lattice model at this time. Do you agree with the Board's conclusion that the fair value of employee share options can be measured with sufficient reliability? If not, why not? Do you agree with the Board's conclusion that a lattice model is preferable because it offers greater flexibility needed to reflect the unique characteristics of employee share options. If not, why not?

We agree that the fair value of a public company can be measured with sufficient reliability, but not that of privately-held companies (see comment on Question 1, above).

We also agree that a pricing model with greater flexibility is better than the current closed-form models currently prescribed.

4c. Some respondents to the Invitation to Comment suggested that the FASB prescribe a single method of estimating expected volatility or even a uniform volatility assumption that would be used for all companies. Other respondents to the Invitation to Comment disagreed with such an approach. Additionally, some parties believe that historical volatility, which has been commonly used as the estimate of expected volatility under Statement 123 as originally issued, is often not an appropriate measure to use. The proposed Statement would require enterprises to make their best estimate of expected volatility (as well as other assumptions) by applying the guidance provided in paragraphs B24–B26 to their specific facts and circumstances. In that regard, the proposed Statement provides guidance on information other than historical volatility that should be used in estimating expected volatility, and explicitly notes that defaulting to historical volatility as the estimate of expected volatility without taking into consideration other available information is not appropriate. If you believe the Board should require a specific method of estimating expected volatility, please explain the method you prefer.

This variable can be arbitrary as well. However, only using historical volatility can be short-sighted.

4d. This proposed Statement provides guidance on how the unique characteristics of employee share options would be considered in estimating their grant-date fair value. For example, to take into account the nontransferability of employee share options, this proposed Statement would require that fair value be estimated using the expected term (which is determined by adjusting the option's contractual term for expected early exercise and post-vesting employment termination behaviors) rather than its contractual term. Moreover, the Board decided that compensation cost should be recognized only for those equity instruments that vest to take into account the risk of forfeiture due to vesting conditions. Do you agree that those methods give appropriate recognition to the unique characteristics of employee share options? If not, what alternative method would more accurately reflect the impact of those factors in estimating the option's fair value? Please provide the basis for your position.

Use the actual terms and maximum number of shares. These methods present an opportunity to manipulate the results.

5. In developing this proposed Statement, the Board acknowledged that there may be circumstances in which it is not possible to reasonably estimate the fair value of an equity instrument. In those cases, the Board decided to require that compensation cost be measured using an intrinsic value method with remeasurement through the settlement date (paragraphs 21 and 22 of Appendix A). Do you agree that the intrinsic value method with remeasurement through the settlement date is the appropriate alternative accounting treatment when it is not possible to reasonably estimate the fair value? (Refer to paragraphs C66 and C67 for the Board's reasons for selecting that method.) If not, what other alternative do you prefer, and why?

Page 4

Again, anytime you use other information than actual fact, you open the possibility of manipulation. We believe this is an effort to record "something" on the books for an expense that may never occur.

6. For the reasons described in paragraph C75, this proposed Statement establishes the principle that an employee stock purchase plan transaction is not compensatory if the employee is entitled to purchase shares on terms that are no more favorable than those available to all holders of the same class of the shares. Do you agree with that principle? If not, why not?

Yes, we agree.

7. This proposed Statement would require that compensation cost be recognized in the financial statements over the requisite service period, which is the period over which employee services are provided in exchange for the employer's equity instruments. Do you believe that the requisite service period is the appropriate basis for attribution? If not, what basis should be used?

If the decision is made that the granting of stock options requires a recording of expense, then, yes use the requisite service period as a basis for attribution.

8. Determining the requisite service period would require analysis of the terms and conditions of an award, particularly when the award contains more than one service, performance, or market condition. Paragraphs B37–B49 provide guidance on estimating the requisite service period. Do you believe that guidance to be sufficient? If not, how should it be expanded or clarified?

In principle, we agree. Only in practice will we know if it is sufficient.

9. For the reasons described in paragraphs C89–C91, the Board concluded that this proposed Statement would require a single method of accruing compensation cost for awards with a graded vesting schedule. This proposed Statement considers an award with a graded vesting schedule to be in substance separate awards, each with a different fair value measurement and requisite service period, and would require that they be accounted for separately. That treatment results in a recognition pattern that attributes more compensation cost to early portions of the combined vesting period of an award and less compensation cost to later portions. Do you agree with that accounting treatment? If not, why not?

Yes, we agree.

10. This proposed Statement establishes several principles that guide the accounting for modifications and settlements, including cancellations of awards of equity instruments (paragraph 35 of Appendix A). Paragraphs C96–C115 explain the factors considered by the Board in developing those principles and the related implementation guidance provided in Appendix B. Do you believe those principles are appropriate? If you believe that additional or different principles should apply to modification and settlement transactions, please describe those principles and how they would change the guidance provided in Appendix B.

Yes, these principles are appropriate.

11. This proposed Statement changes the method of accounting for income tax effects established in Statement 123 as originally issued. Paragraphs 41–44 of Appendix A describe the proposed method of accounting for income tax effects and paragraphs C128–C138 describe the Board's rationale. That method also differs from the one required in International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 2, Share-based Payment. Do you agree with the method of

Page 5

accounting for income taxes established by this proposed Statement? If not, what method (including the method established in IFRS 2) do you prefer, and why?

No, we do not agree with the method. All amounts added to Paid-in-Capital, due to the issuance of stock options, should be deducted from Paid-in-Capital before there is any further income statement effect.

12. Because compensation cost would be recognized for share-based compensation transactions, the Board concluded that it was appropriate to reconsider and modify the information required to be disclosed for such

transactions. The Board also decided to frame the disclosure requirements of this proposed Statement in terms of disclosure objectives (paragraph 46 of Appendix A). Those objectives are supplemented by related implementation guidance describing the minimum disclosures required to meet those objectives (paragraphs B191–B193). Do you believe that the disclosure objectives set forth in this proposed Statement are appropriate and complete? If not, what would you change and why? Do you believe that the minimum required disclosures are sufficient to meet those disclosure objectives? If not, what additional disclosures should be required? Please provide an example of any additional disclosure you would suggest.

We agree that the disclosure objectives are appropriate and complete. We agree that the minimum required disclosures are sufficient, except perhaps adding further notification to the readers of the financial statements that estimates used are within a reasonable range of values.

13. This proposed Statement would require the modified prospective method of transition for public companies and would not permit retrospective application (paragraphs 20 and 21). The Board's rationale for that decision is discussed in paragraphs C157–C162. Do you agree with the transition provisions of this proposed Statement? If not, why not? Do you believe that entities should be permitted to elect retrospective application upon adoption of this proposed Statement? If so, why?

We agree with the transition provisions. We do not believe that entities should be permitted to elect retrospective application. Doing so would eliminate the ability to compare companies and their financial results.

14a. This proposed Statement would permit nonpublic entities to elect to use an intrinsic value method of accounting (with final measurement of compensation cost at the settlement date) rather than the fair-value-based method, which is preferable. Do you agree with the Board's conclusion to allow an intrinsic value method for nonpublic entities? If not, why not?

Yes, we believe the decisions are appropriate. But, only if the decision is made to expense stock options upon grant. As we commented above, we do not agree that options are compensation that should be recorded, and in the non-public sector where there is little or no marketability of these options, the concept really makes no sense.

14b. Consistent with its mission, when the Board developed this proposed Statement it evaluated whether it would fill a significant need and whether the costs imposed to apply this proposed Statement, as compared to other alternatives, would be justified in relation to the overall benefits of the resulting information. As part of that evaluation, the Board carefully considered the impact of this proposed Statement on nonpublic entities and made several decisions to mitigate the incremental costs those entities would incur in complying with its provisions. For example, the Board decided to permit those entities to elect to use either the fair-value-based method or the intrinsic value method (with final measurement of compensation cost at settlement date) of accounting for share-based

compensation arrangements. Additionally, the Board selected transition provisions that it believes will minimize costs of transition (most nonpublic entities would use a prospective method of transition rather than the modified prospective method required for public entities). Moreover, the Board decided to extend the effective date of this proposed Statement for nonpublic entities to provide them additional time to study its requirements and plan for transition. Do you believe those decisions are appropriate? If not, why not? Should other modifications of this proposed Statement's provisions be made for those entities?

Page 6

Yes, but see our comment on 14a above.

15. Some argue that the cost-benefit considerations that led the Board to propose certain accounting alternatives for nonpublic entities should apply equally to small business issuers, as defined by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Do you believe that some or all of those alternatives should be extended to those public entities?

Yes.

16. For the reasons discussed in paragraphs C139—C143, the Board decided that this proposed Statement would amend FASB Statement No. 95, Statement of Cash Flows, to require that excess tax benefits, as defined by this proposed Statement, be reported as a financing cash inflow rather than as a reduction of taxes paid (paragraphs 17–19). Do you agree with reflecting those excess tax benefits as financing cash inflows? If not, why not?

No, we disagree. Taxes are a part of operations, and whatever the tax effects that result from a company's operations, these should be shown as cash flow from operations. To single out this one example and remove it from cash flow from operations is arbitrary.

17. Certain accounting treatments for share-based payment transactions with employees in this proposed Statement differ from those in IFRS 2, including the accounting for nonpublic enterprises, income tax effects, and certain modifications. Those differences are described more fully in Appendix C. If you prefer the accounting treatment accorded by IFRS 2, please identify the difference and provide the basis for your preference. If you prefer the accounting treatment in the proposed Statement, do you believe the Board nonetheless should consider adopting the accounting treatment prescribed in IFRS 2 in the interest of achieving convergence?

We believe that convergence is the ultimate goal, so that there are consistent accounting standards worldwide. Therefore, consideration should be given to IFRS 2. However, we also believe the movement to convergence should not be done in a piecemeal fashion, but in a more concerted effort. Making a change to an IFRS standard for this one issue is not appropriate at this time.

18. The Board's objective is to issue financial accounting standards that can be read and understood by those possessing a reasonable level of accounting knowledge, a reasonable understanding of the business and economic activities covered by the accounting standard, and a willingness to study the standard with reasonable diligence. Do you believe that this proposed Statement, taken as a whole, achieves that objective?

No. Only a handful of accountants will understand this Statement. The average investor will also not have the ability to understand the financial information presented.

Again, thank you for your consideration of our comments.

Sincerely,

David D. Chandler, CPA

Chair, WSCPA AARS Committee

On behalf of the: Accounting, Auditing, and Review Services Committee Washington Society of CPA's 902 140th NE Bellevue, WA 98005 425.644.4800